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A BSTRACT : This student comment explores the Palermo Protocol to
the United Nation’s Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, and the United State’s response, the Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act (TVPA). Under the TVPA, the U.S. made a temporary,
nonimmigrant visa, the T-Visa, available to trafficking victims illegally located in the U.S., provided that the victim cooperates with law
enforcement to prosecute their trafficker. Though at first blush the TVisa seems like a valuable resource to victims who would otherwise
find no immigration relief for violations of criminal and immigration
law as a result of their victimization, but in practice the flawed process to obtain a T-Visa criminalizes victims. This criminalization violates the intent of the Palermo Protocol.
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EXCHANGING COOPERATION FOR VISAS:
FLAWS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM CRIMINALIZES
TRAFFICKING VICTIMS
Laurie Culkin
INTRODUCTION
The Palermo Protocol is a supplement to the United Nation’s
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which aims to
prevent international human trafficking and the criminalization of
trafficking victims.1 The U.S. is a party to the Protocol, and enacted
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000 as a response. The TVPA has three prongs: prevention, prosecution, and
protection. The T – Visa, under the protection arm of the TVPA, allows undocumented trafficking victims, who are in the country illegally, to stay in the U.S. temporarily, if they cooperate with law enforcement in prosecuting their trafficker. If victims do not cooperate,
or are not identified as victims, they are likely to be detained and then
removed from the country.
Although removal (colloquially known as “deportation”)2 is not
a criminal sanction, removal proceedings bear many similarities to
criminal justice proceedings. The removal process treats trafficking
victims as if they are criminals, and reinforces the idea that the individual is being punished for being a victim of an international crime.
Deportation due to ineffective immigration relief criminalizes trafficking victims, which is in direct conflict with the Palermo Protocol.

1.

2.

See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Dec. 13, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319,
pmbl [hereinafter Palermo Protocol].
Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 289, footnote 2 (2008).
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BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to Trafficking
Trafficking in persons is defined as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or
use of force or other forms of coercion, fraud, or deception to gain
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation.3 The
main forms of trafficking are sexual exploitation and forced labor.4
Human trafficking is different than human smuggling.5 Trafficking
requires no movement, just the presence of force, fraud or coercion
for the purpose of exploiting the victim.6 Though movement across
international borders is not an element of trafficking, it often is incidental to trafficking crimes.7
Hard data about the prevalence of trafficking and the victims is
difficult to come by because trafficking is illegal across the globe;8
however, we know that women and children of low socioeconomic
status are the predominant victims.9 Victims of human trafficking
who are in the U.S. illegally are most often from countries with rampant poverty and gender inequality.10 These individuals are lured by
traffickers to countries with better economies under the false pretense
of employment in positions such as dancers, hostesses, or nannies.11
Lack of resources, violence, the presence of armed conflict, and

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.

Palermo Protocol, art. 3.
Id.
Fact Sheet: Distinctions Between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking, U.S.
DEP’T. OF STATE, (Apr. 2006).
Id. (“Although TIP is often an international crime that involves the crossing of borders, it is important to note that trafficking in persons victims can be trafficked within
their own countries and communities. Traffickers can move victims between locations
within the same country and often sell them to other trafficking organizations.”)
Id.
Alison Phinney, Trafficking Women and Children for Sexual Exploitation in the Americas, PAN-AMERICAN HEALTH ORG., 3,
http://www1.paho.org/English/ad/ge/TraffickingPaper.pdf
Id. at 1; Fact Sheet, supra note 5.
Phinney, supra note 8, at 1-2.
Dina Francesca Haynes, Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported: Extending Immigration Benefits to Protect the Victims of Trafficking and to Secure the Prosecution of
Traffickers, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 221, 226 (2004); Ankita Patel, Back to the Drawing
Board: Rethinking Protections Available to Victims of Trafficking, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 813, 819 (2011).
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natural disasters in home countries, coupled with gender inequality,
leave women and children the most vulnerable to manipulation.12
Though the presence of trafficking around the world is widespread, it is kept relatively invisible through the control traffickers
have over their victims: some are forcibly kept silent, and others are
silenced by their fear of retaliation, police, and immigration officers.13 Traffickers exercise different methods to maintain control over
their victims, some physical and some psychological.14 Common
physical tactics involve restricting victim movement, often through
confiscation of travel documents, physical beatings, and rape.15 Traffickers also rely heavily on psychological tactics by creating situations of dependence and debt bondage.16 In a typical debt bondage
scenario, a trafficker places an initial debt on the victim – for foreign
national victims it may be initial travel costs to the receiving country
– and refuses to let the victim leave their forced employment until the
debt is paid off. The trafficker then adds on additional fees, often for
things such as food, rent, and other living expenses so the victim can
never get ahead of their debt.17 The trafficker also maintains control
of the victim’s money. This forces a sense of dependence on the trafficker.18
Further, traffickers often combine both physical and psychological manipulation techniques, which may result in “trauma bonding,”
or what is frequently called “Stockholm Syndrome.”19 A victim develops a dysfunctional attachment to their victimizer that occurs in
the presence of danger, shame, or exploitation, and some physical
danger or risk is present.20 To accomplish this effect, traffickers in12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

Phinney, supra note 8, at 2.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5. (Physical beatings and rapes are often used to initiate a person into the sex
industry, forcing compliance from the victim. Physical beatings, rapes, and threats of
beatings and rapes are often used after as punishment for not obeying their trafficker’s
demands).
Id. at 4.
Phinney, supra note 8, at 4.
Phinney, supra note 4, at 4.
In their shoes: Understanding Victims’ Mindsets and Common Barriers to Victim
Identification, POLARIS PROJECT,
http://www.nova.edu/hs/humantrafficking/forms/section3.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2015).
Phinney, supra note 8, at 2.
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tentionally shower their victims with attention, affection and gifts to
establish the victim’s trust.21 In particular, traffickers often seek out
victims with abusive pasts who are emotionally vulnerable, and thus
more susceptible to these techniques.22 After the trafficker has established trust, the trafficker abuses the victim, often physically or sexually.23 This emotionally breaks the victim, so they become completely dependent on their trafficker.24 Minors are particularly vulnerable
to trauma bonding with their captor.25
B. The Palermo Protocol
The Palermo Protocol, also known as the “Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children,” is a supplemental protocol to the UN Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime.26 The purpose of the Protocol is to
prevent and combat trafficking in persons, with a special emphasis on
women and children.27 It calls for an international, collaborative approach, and highlights the importance of protecting victims and their
fundamental human rights.28 Currently, there are 166 state parties to
the Protocol, including the United States.29
The Protocol has two main provisions: protection of victims of
trafficking in persons,30 and prevention, cooperation, and other

21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

30.

Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States, THE POLARIS PROJECT,
http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/prosecutingtraffickers/895-sex-trafficking-of-minors (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Palermo Protocol, supra note 1, at pmbl.
Palermo Protocol, supra note 1, at pmbl.
Id. (Declaring that effective action to prevent and combat trafficking in persons, especially women and children, requires a comprehensive international approach in the
countries of origin, transit and destination that includes measures to prevent such trafficking, to punish the traffickers and to protect the victims of such trafficking, including by protecting their internationally recognized human rights.”)
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transanational
Organized Crime, Status as at 5-12-2015, UN TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12a&chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
Palermo Protocol, supra note 1, at section II.
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measures.31 The protection provision enumerates several requirements designed to protect victims of trafficking, particularly those
who are victimized in foreign countries, and emphasizes the importance of maintaining the victim’s human rights.32 This section encourages countries to implement immigration relief for victims as
part of their rights. Specifically, the Protocol states that “each State
Party shall consider adopting legislative or other appropriate
measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its
territory, temporarily or permanently, in appropriate cases,”33 and
When a State Party returns a victim of trafficking in persons to a
State Party of which that person is a national … such return shall be
with due regard for the safety of that person and for the status of any
legal proceedings related to the fact that the person is a victim of trafficking and shall preferably be voluntary.34
The second provision encompasses both prevention and the steps
to be taken by law enforcement and immigration enforcement when
prosecuting trafficking-related crimes.35 This section details the steps
required to educate law enforcement and immigration agencies on
trafficking, and to improve the competency of officers in identifying
and interacting with victims.36 Relevant sections require that “State
Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programs and other
measures to protect victims of trafficking in persons … from revictimization;”37 “State parties shall take or strengthen measures … to
alleviate factors … that make persons … vulnerable to trafficking,
such as poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of equal opportunity;”38
and
States Parties shall provide or strengthen training for law enforcement, immigration and other relevant officials in the prevention
of trafficking in persons. The training should focus on methods used
in preventing such trafficking, prosecuting the traffickers and protect-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Palermo Protocol, section III.
See Palermo Protocol, art. 6.
Palermo Protocol, art. 7(1).
Palermo Protocol, art. 8(2).
See Palermo Protocol, arts. 9-13.
See Palermo Protocol, arts. 9-13.
Palermo Protocol, art. 9(1)(b).
Palermo Protocol, art. 9(4).
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ing the rights of the victims, including protecting the victims from the
traffickers.39
C. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act
i. Generally
The U.S. enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000
as a requirement of the Palermo Protocol as is required of all state
parties.40 The TVPA follows a three-prong approach modeled after
the subsections of the Protocol: prosecution, protection, and prevention.41 The prosecution arm of the TVPA allows the government to
prosecute “severe forms of trafficking.”42 This is defined as “sex
trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud
or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has
not attained 18 years of age.”43 In determining whether to proceed
with prosecution, law enforcement has to determine whether the person is a victim as defined by the law, and whether or not the case is
severe enough to warrant criminal prosecution.44 If law enforcement
decides to proceed with the case, prosecutors rely in large part on the
victim’s cooperation.45 In order to induce cooperation, the prosecution arm of the TVPA offers immigration incentives to foreign national victims residing in the U.S. illegally, which allow the victim to
remain in the country temporarily, in exchange for their cooperation
in prosecuting their trafficker.46
The protection arm of the TVPA establishes the minimum requirements for protection of victims.47
The intention is to
acknowledge the factors that lead individual to become victims of
trafficking, and to recognize the collateral consequences victims face
when returning to their country of origin, such as shame, ostracism,
threats to physical safety, risk of re-trafficking, and lack of support in
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Palermo Protocol, art. 10(2).
Palermo Protocol, art. 16; see U.S. Dep’t. of State, Trafficking in Persons Rep. 29
(2014) [hereinafter TIP Report].
Patel, supra note 11, at 815.
Patel, supra note 11, at 816-17.
22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2013).
Patel, supra note 11, at 817.
Patel, supra note 11, at 817.
Patel, supra note 11, at 817.
Patel, supra note 11, at 817.
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recovery.48 The protection arm offers two different kinds of protection for trafficking victims in the U.S.: legal alternatives to removal
proceedings, through the T-Visa; and measures to ensure that victims
are not inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or penalized.49 Protection
against inappropriate incarceration is intended to encompass both
immigration and criminal law violations, and covers undocumented
victims who violate immigration laws due to trafficking, who should
instead be provided with alternatives to remain in the U.S. legally.50
The prevention arm sets out requirements for U.S. cooperation
with international efforts to address the vulnerabilities of potential
victims in their countries of origin, as well as coordinate domestic efforts to educate citizens on trafficking and relief available to victims.51 The TVPA acknowledges that victims most often originate
from countries with disparate social and economic conditions, and
thrives on the powerlessness of women and girls to change their economic status.52 Victims are often isolated and unaware of their rights
after arriving in the U.S., so the prevention arm aims to educate victims and communities about trafficking through prevention campaigns.53
To aid in international anti-trafficking efforts, the U.S. Department of State issues the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report.
The TIP Report evaluates the anti-trafficking efforts of every country
across the globe, and categorizes them into different tiers based on
their performance.54 The Department of State uses the U.S. TVPA as
the standard to judge each country, with subcategories for prevention,
protection, and prosecution.55 All countries are compiled into a chart
based on region, which enumerates the numbers of victims identified,
prosecutions, convictions, and new legislation.56 As of 2014, the U.S.
rated itself as a tier 1 country for fully complying with the TVPA’s
minimum standard.57
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Patel, supra note 11, at 817.
22 U.S.C. § 7106 (2013).
Patel, supra note 11, at 818.
22 U.S.C. § 7106.
Patel, supra note 11, at 819.
Patel, supra note 11, at 819.
TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 57-64.
I TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 57.
TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 59-64.
TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 58.
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ii. The T-Visa Under Protection Arm
In response to the TVPA. of 2000, the T-Visa was created for
victims of “severe forms of trafficking in persons,” who are physically present in the U.S. or a port of entry as a result of trafficking.58
Victims over the age of eighteen must cooperate with “any reasonable request” for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of trafficking in order to obtain the non-immigrant visa.59 If the person cooperates, law enforcement certifies that they are a “victim” both
under the law and for purposes of immigration relief.60 The statute
does not give any guidance as to what constitutes a “reasonable request,” providing broad discretion to the individual law enforcement
agency.61 In some jurisdictions “reasonableness” means simply complying with an investigation; while in others “reasonableness” includes total cooperation with police and prosecutors through the entire litigation process, including testifying in court against their
trafficker.62 In order to obtain immigration relief, the victim must also demonstrate “extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm
upon removal.”63 A maximum of 5,000 T-visas are allowed per
year.64 However the visa is greatly underutilized, and significantly
less than 5,000 are issued annually.65 Only 2,300 total were issued in
first 10 years since the creation of the T-Visa.66
PROBLEM
The Palermo Protocol intends to prevent the criminalization and
revictimization of trafficking victims. Thus, having ratified the Protocol, the U.S. expressly prohibits criminalizing victims through it’s
domestic criminal law and immigration law systems, and offers undocumented victims of trafficking remedies to remain in the U.S. legally. However, in order to access these remedies, undocumented
trafficking victims must cooperate with law enforcement in prosecut58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2014) [hereinafter INA].
Id.
22 U.S.C. § 7105 (2013).
See id.; Patel, supra note 11, at 817.
Patel, supra note 11, at 818.
Patel, supra note 11, at 818.
Patel, supra note 11, at 822.
Patel, supra note 11, at 822.
Patel, supra note 11, at 818.
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ing their trafficker, or they will be subject to removal proceedings
back to their country of origin, under a violation of immigration law.
The strict constraints of the T- Visa means many victims will not
meet the statutory requirements. Further, those who meet the statutory requirements still may not satisfy the standards of local law enforcement, failing to provide whatever assistance is deemed “adequate cooperation” in that particular jurisdiction. Though relief is
available to a few victims who manage to jump through the various
bureaucratic hoops, many other undocumented victims are being
criminalized by the flaws in the system, and are subject removal proceedings that are indistinguishable from criminal law proceedings.
ANALYSIS
The Palermo Protocol and U.S. law calls for the decriminalization of trafficking victims. To this end, the TVPA established TVisas, which allow undocumented trafficking victims the opportunity
to remain in the U.S. legally for a period, as long as they aid law enforcement in prosecuting their trafficker. However, there are limited
numbers given out annually, and, as noted above, the visa is drastically underutilized.
In order for an individual to be eligible for a T-Visa, the government must identify the person as a “victim” of a “severe form of
trafficking,” and the victim must meet certain statutory requirements.
Specifically, individuals must cooperate with law enforcement to
prosecute their trafficker in order to be certified as eligible for relief;
however, this certification is at the discretion of the law enforcement
organization involved. Victims must also demonstrate that sending
them back to their country of origin would amount to “unusual and
severe” harm.67 Even if a victim meets all of the statutory requirements, the T-Visa is a temporary, non-immigrant visa, which still
leaves her vulnerable to removal proceedings once the visa expires.68
The Criminalization of Immigration Removal Proceedings
Removal proceedings are the primary mechanism by which the
government expels noncitizens from the U.S., or prevents their ad67.
68.

INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(IV) (2014).
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2014). (Section 101(a) enumerates all non-immigrant
visas available to noncitizens of the U.S).
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mission under the Immigration and Naturalization Act.69 Deportation
is traditionally a civil matter; however, for those going through removal proceedings, the experience is often indistinguishable from
traditional criminal proceedings.70 The history of expulsion, the procedural parallels to the criminal justice system, the methods of enforcement, and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence have led scholars
to argue that deportation is more akin to criminal proceedings rather
than a civil, administrative function.
i. Purpose of Criminal and Immigration Law
Boiled down to the core, criminal and immigration law serve the
same function.71 Both serve to control physical inclusion or exclusion from society in the United States, and create rules that establish
lesser levels of citizenship.72 Modern American law further intertwines criminal law and immigration law, where noncitizens that
have committed past crimes may not be admitted in to the U.S., immigration law violations themselves are crimes, and many criminal
law violations are deportable offenses for lawful permanent residents.73
Looking to the history of deportation, which has its roots in banishment, sheds light on the intent of current law.74 Throughout history, banishment from one’s community has been used as a punishment
for serious violations of society’s mores.75 Under English common
law, banishment was used as a criminal punishment imposed on both
subjects and foreigners.76 In 1718, English Parliament enacted the
Transportation Act, which allowed criminals to be sentenced to
“transportation” out of the Kingdom for major crimes, and allocated

69.
70.
71.
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Markowitz, supra note 2, at 290.
Id. at 289.
Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 380-381 (2006).
Id. at 396-397 (quoting Nora V. Demleiner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153,
158 (1999), “Both systems act as gatekeepers in our society, determining whether an
individual should be included or excluded from society.”).
Id. at 380.
See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 300.
See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 322.
See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 322.
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public funds to transport the criminals to the United States.77 Criminal transportation was the only type of expulsion available, with no
civil expulsion provisions.78 The English Model set the precedent for
expulsion in the American colonies, which followed suit, and used
banishment as a punishment imposed for criminal violations.79 Under
President John Adams’ administration, the United States enacted the
Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, which allowed for the expulsion of
any alien who committed a crime in America after the alien went before a criminal court.80
ii. Procedural Parallels
There are striking procedural parallels between criminal law and
immigration law enforcement. In both, a judge’s decision in a case
directly impacts the subject’s physical liberties, either by incarcerating the individual or by forcibly removing them from the country.81
An individual suspected of violating immigration law is subject to a
hearing in court before a judge, and may be represented by a lawyer;
however, in immigration law one will not be provided by the court.
In an immigration hearing, the respondent has the opportunity to present witnesses, and in many cases there is also a prosecuting attorney
pursuing the rights of the U.S.82
iii. Enforcement Parallels
Prior to 2002, the Department of Commerce and Labor handled
immigration enforcement, responsibilities then shifted to the Department of Justice, and eventually to the Department of Homeland Security at present.83 This change in departments shifted immigration enforcement towards a more law enforcement like structure.84
Immigration law enforcement officers are uniformed, and, like criminal law enforcement officers, are permitted to conduct surveillance,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 323.
See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 323.
See Markowitz, supra note 2, at 325.
An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, 1 Stat.570 (1798) available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/alsedact.asp.
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 390.
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 390.
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 387-88.
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 387-88.
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execute warrants, make arrests, and detain those suspected of violating immigration law.85 In 2001, to aid domestic officers, Immigration
and Naturalization Service began to enter civil immigration information into the Federal Bureau of Investigation database that state
police frequently use in day-to-day investigations and arrests.86
Detention is the immigration law equivalent to incarceration in
criminal law.87 Noncitizens, including women and children, may be
held at detention centers awaiting their hearing or during investigation periods.88 Undocumented people in the U.S. may be detained for
seven days without cause,89 and administrative rules have been expanded to permit detention for a “reasonable period of time” under
extraordinary circumstance.90 The U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished detention from incarceration, saying that the purpose of detention in an immigration context is to ensure that the individual facing deportation attends their administrative hearings, and to guarantee
ease of removal from the country.91 Despite this distinction, noncitizens are often held in the same detention centers as criminals.92
Under U.S. immigration law, there is also mandatory detention
of noncitizens for violations of certain crimes.93 Prostitution is one of
these crimes, and is also the charge most often given to victims of
trafficking who are being sexually exploited.94 The law further allows noncitizens to be deported if the person has committed prostitution within ten years prior to admission or application for a visa.95
There is only one exception that allows for the victim to be released,
and similar to the T-Visa, it also requires the victim to cooperate with
law enforcement.96

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Stumpf, supra note 71, at 390.
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 389.
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391.
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391.
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391.
8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2006).
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391.
Stumpf, supra note 71, at 391.
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2014); see also INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (2014).
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2014); see also INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (2014).
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2014); see also INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (2014).
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2014).
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iv. Padilla v. Kentucky
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion that expressly confirmed what legal scholars have been asserting, that deportation
is not strictly a civil, administrative action. In Padilla v. Kentucky,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that deportation is uniquely difficult to classify, and is not a civil matter per se, but rather falls somewhere between civil and criminal law.97 The case arose when a man,
who had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for 40
years, pled guilty to a felony drug charge under the suggestion of his
legal counsel.98 Mr. Padilla’s counsel advised him that because he
had been in the U.S. for so long, he would not be deported for pleading guilty.99 However, the guilty plea put his immigration status in
jeopardy.100
The Court held that an attorney is obligated to tell a noncitizen
client that pleading guilty to a crime may result in forced removal
from the United States.101 Previously, the Supreme Court viewed deportation as a “collateral consequence” of a criminal plea.102 In Padilla, the Supreme Court acknowledged that deportation is a severe
and more direct consequence of pleading guilty, and effectively
struck down this notion.103 In practice, this holding had the effect of
expanding the protections given to noncitizens in criminal proceedings.104 In addition, this holding set a new standard for the effectiveness of counsel.105 Legal scholars have interpreted this decision as
the beginning of a tidal shift in immigration law jurisprudence. The
Court began to recognize that deportation proceedings are quasi-
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criminal in nature,106 and these penalties are serious, often draconian,
and lifelong.107
b. Implications of Deportation Unique to Trafficking
According to the U.S. Department of State, more than 50,000
people are trafficked into the U.S. each year.108 Although there is
immigration relief for non-citizen victims in the United States, enacted law is only as good as its enforcement.109 Today, T-Visas are
drastically underutilized, and victims are slipping through the cracks
in the system.110 This discrepancy can be attributed to law enforcement’s inability to identify victims, and victims who are unwilling to
report trafficking to authorities for fear of deportation.111
Trafficking victims are more likely than many other kinds of victims to be misidentified, most often as unauthorized migrants or as
criminals, when in reality they have only committed offenses the trafficker forced them to perform, such as prostitution or drug smuggling.112 Even if individuals are identified as victims, they are often
still detained if they choose not to cooperate with law enforcement.113
This incarceration is re-traumatizing to victims and reinforces the notion that society sees them as criminals, though they are not going
through criminal proceedings.114 When deportation is the default response to lack of cooperation with a prosecution or investigation, it
means that no one is assessing the dangers of returning victims to
their country of origin.115 This puts the victim at risk of retaliation
and re-trafficking.116 In addition, if cooperating with law enforcement is a victim’s only option, and no other meaningful immigration
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protections or opportunities are available, it calls the voluntariness of
the victim’s compliance into question.117
C. Comparative Legislation - Italy
Internationally, other countries have acknowledged that restrictive immigration laws in “destination” countries contribute to the
growth of trafficking in persons.118 Those vulnerable to trafficking
are often enticed by the opportunity for a better life abroad, but have
little means to get to that country legally, due to stringent immigration laws.119 Vulnerable individuals rely on others to provide them
with false documents, arrange their travel, and find them employment
in the receiving country, which often leads to sexual exploitation and
labor trafficking.120
Italy has been identified as a popular destination country in Europe, with a high population of “migrants” from other nations relocating to work.121 Higher levels of migrants frequently means higher
levels of trafficking.122 To combat human trafficking, Italy, in conjunction with the International Organization for Migration, identified
frequent migration routes and instituted programs to allow easy and
legal immigration options to potential victims of trafficking.123 Specifically, Italy issues 5,000 work visas annually to Albanians, acknowledging the Balkan Peninsula as its largest source country for
trafficking and smuggling.124 Having legal options means potential
victims are less likely to rely on traffickers to migrate for better employment.125
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CONCLUSION
a. The U.S. is in Violation of the Palermo Protocol
In practice, current U.S. immigration law criminalizes victims of
human trafficking, and therefore violates the intention of the Palermo
Protocol. In the Supreme Court case, which made deportation a civil
sanction, Justice Brewer famously dissented, saying:
But it needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition
that deportation is punishment. Everyone knows that to be forcibly
taken away from home and family and friends and business and
property, and sent across the ocean to distant land, is punishment, and
that oftentimes most severe and cruel.126
The TVPA is the United State’s implementation of the requirements of the Palermo Protocol.127 The Palermo Protocol calls for all
State Parties to consider adopting laws to permit victims of trafficking to remain in that territory,128 and that if a State Party returns a victim to their country of origin they do so with “due regard” for the
safety of the victim. The Protocol also specifies that the return
should “preferably be voluntary.”129 The TVPA incorporates these
ideals in its protection arm, which offers the T-Visa as protection
from involuntary deportation, and aims to ensure victims are not improperly incarcerated, fined or penalized.130
Indeed, the U.S. acknowledges that trafficking victims should
not be detained or penalized for acts associated with trafficking, and
extends this protection to those who violate immigration laws as a result.131 In the 2014 TIP Report, the theme is “The Journey from Victim to Survivor,” and the introduction reads:
Another early step, while seemingly obvious, is nevertheless
one of the greatest challenges to anti-trafficking efforts in
general: finding the victims and getting them out of harm’s
way. The strongest victim protection scheme is useless if
victims remain trapped in exploitation. Governments cannot
126.
127.
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131.
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sit back and wait for victims to self-identify; rather, they
must proactively seek victims out by investigating high-risk
sectors, screening vulnerable populations, and training relevant government officials to recognize trafficking when
they see it. It is vital that victims not be treated like criminals or be subjected to arrest or deportation for other offenses.132
T-Visas are the device created by the U.S. to protect victims
from being exposed to immigration sanctions. Though the stated intention is to protect victims, T-Visas only offer incentives to those
victims who cooperate in prosecution.
The immigration law statute governing the T-Visa requires an
individual to comply with “any reasonable request” by law enforcement in order to qualify.133 By forcing victims to either work with
law enforcement to prosecute their trafficker, or go through removal
proceedings, the U.S. is still forcing victims into the hands of law enforcement with their physical liberty on the line. Victims do not have
a choice; they must go through the system one way or the other.
In addition, the small number of visas available annually,134 and
the even smaller number actually issued,135 compared to the 50,000
people trafficked into the U.S. each year, shows that victims are slipping through the cracks in the system. This leads to disproportionate
numbers of trafficking victims going through deportation proceedings. The Protocol requires that countries “shall” establish comprehensive measures to protect trafficking victims from revictimization.136
Removal proceedings criminalize victims, though they are still
technically classified as non-criminals, because they are indistinguishable within the criminal justice system. Although the U.S. argues that deportation is civil and administrative in nature, we still
force victims to go through a quasi-judicial hearing in front of a finder of fact. We also require that the individual defend him or herself
132. TIP REPORT, supra note 40, at 7 (emphasis added).
133. See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T).
134. See Patel, supra note 11, at 818 (5,000 T Visas are available each year by the Department of Homeland Security).
135. See id. (0nly 2,300 T-Visas were issued from 2000-2010).
136. Palermo Protocol, supra note 1, at art. 9(1)(b).
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in that hearing, and encourage the victim to seek counsel, who can
examine witnesses and put on evidence on their behalf.
The U.S. aims to encourage victims to come forward and report
their traffickers, but we force those who do come forward to make
the choice between cooperation and deportation. Corruption is rampant among police, border police, and other government officials that
handle immigration and law enforcement in source countries with
major trafficking problems.137 By forcing victims in the U.S. to comply to obtain a visa, it reinforces noncitizen victim’s distrust of law
enforcement and fear that they will be deported. In the U.S., Immigration officials look and act the same as criminal law enforcement
officials, and victims may face detention for extended periods of time
while awaiting their hearing.
Finally, undocumented victims going through deportation proceedings are likely unfamiliar with the American judicial system. If
deportation proceedings appear so closely related to the criminal justice system to American legal academics that study them, how could
the American government expect a foreign victim of trafficking to
tell the difference?
b. Switching to a Victim Centered Approach
The U.S. Department of State in the 2014 T.I.P. Report, calls for
a victim-centered approach to anti-trafficking programs, and specifically highlights the importance of victim identification and immigration relief.138 The Protocol protection provisions are silent on the
practice of required compliance with law enforcement, but overall
encourage a compassionate and humanitarian response. Despite
claims to the contrary, the U.S. follows a prosecutorial approach to
anti-trafficking, which places prosecution of traffickers as the first
priority.139 Enforcement-dominated anti-trafficking strategies relegate victim protection to a secondary role rather than a complementary or necessary role.140 Responses that arrest, detain and deport vic-
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tims thwart victim identification, and consequently disempower the
victim.141
Switching from a prosecutorial approach to a victim-centered,
human-rights approach would be congruent with the Protocol, would
help victims begin to heal, and would lead to more successful prosecutions overall.142 Trafficked people require alternatives to systems
in which deportation is the default, such as services, work authorization, and legal immigration status.143 Victim protections are not in
conflict with tough law enforcement, and implementation of proactive identification of victims, funded victims services, and alternatives to detention would respect the trafficked persons’ human rights
and yield better prosecution results.144
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